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For most economists, the appropriate test for evaluating risk
regulation policies is the same as that used in evaluating policies
in other contexts: whether the benefits of the policy exceed the
costs.' In the case of risk regulation, the value of the benefits of
a policy consists of the statistical lives saved as a result of the
policy, weighted by society's willingness to pay for the reduction
in risk, the statistical value of life. These benefits must be mea-
sured against the costs of the policy. More than a decade of eco-
nomic research has been directed at refining the value of a
statistical life for purposes of measuring the benefits of a risk reg-
ulation policy against its costs.2
Despite the apparently straightforward nature of this bene-
fit-cost approach, this basic economic test for risk regulation re-
mains controversial. Most risk regulation agencies have
legislative mandates that prohibit basing policies on benefit-cost
tests. Instead, policy objectives tend to be more narrowly de-
* George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke University. The author is
also Director of the Program on Risk Analysis and Civil Liability. A.B., sunma
cum laude, 1971, Harvard College, Harvard University, M.P.P. in public policy,
1973, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; A.M. in economics,
1974, and Ph.D. in economics, 1976, Department of Economics, Harvard Uni-
versity. The author has published 15 books and 166 articles, most of which deal
with various aspects of risk.
1 See generally EDrTH STOKEY & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, A PmiaiF
FOR POLICY ANALYsis (1978) (discussing the principles of benefit-cost analysis
and policy analysis).
2 See, e.g., John Garen, Compensating Wage Differentials and the En-
dogeneity of Job Riskiness, 70 REv. ECON. & STAT. 9 (1988); Craig A. Olson,
An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs, 16
J. Hum. REsouRcEs 167 (1981); see also W. KP Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS:
PUBLIc AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILrrIES FOR RISK 51-74 (1992) [hereinafter FA-
TAL TRAD-oFFs] (reviewing statistical life research); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value
of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. Lr rExruRE 1912, 1912-46 (1993)
[hereinafter Value of Risks] (reviewing similar research).
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fined. For example, the intent of a policy may be restricted to
achieving a reasonable degree of risk reduction.3
Even in situations in which detailed economic assessments
are carried out, government agencies are understandably reluc-
tant to attach an explicit value to human life. What price per life
will appear to be defensible to the general public? Although the
administrative process for the issuance of new regulations often
includes an assessment of the benefits of saving lives, there has
been very little public debate over the dollar value that should be
attached to each statistical life which will be saved through gov-
ernment action.4
In Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regu-
lation, Justice Stephen Breyer shares this reluctance to endorse a
specific value of human life.5 Breyer recasts the traditional eco-
nomic test in two ways that avoid an assessment of the value of
life. First, Breyer utilizes a personal choice reference point for
automobile safety that allows a comparison of the reasonableness
of various risk reduction efforts in public contexts with the rea-
sonableness of such efforts in private contexts.6 This cost-effec-
tiveness method examines only the cost of a regulatory policy
and the hypothetical number of lives saved. Second, Breyer sets
forth a risk magnitude test that looks solely at the hypothetical
3 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (1988); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
509 (1981) (finding explicitly that benefit-cost tests should be ruled out); Indus-
trial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-42,
653 (1980) (concluding that the agency had to address significant risks of harm
and issue standards- that were "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to pro-
mote safety and health and that the Secretary must find "on the basis of sub-
stantial evidence, that it is at least more likely than not that long-term exposure
to [the hazard without new regulation] presents a significant risk of material
health impairment"); see also W. KIP VIscusI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING
HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 16 (1983) [hereinafter RISK BY
CHOICE] (discussing the limited role of benefit-cost tests in job safety regula-
tions); FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 250 (discussing appropriate balanc-
ing of benefits and costs of policies).
4 Perhaps the greatest exception to this absence of a public debate over the
value of life was the recent controversy over the linkage between regulatory
expenditures and mortality. In particular, what level of regulatory expenditures
will lead to the loss of a statistical life because society has been made poorer
because of the expenditures? This question, which is analytically distinct from
the value of life from the standpoint of risk regulation, will be explored further
below.
5 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993).
6 Id at 67.
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number of lives saved.7 This method also utilizes comparison,
this time in the form of examining a risk ladder, the focus of
which is cigarette smoking risks.
This Article examines the extent to which assessments of
risk policies that utilize only a portion of the elements of the ben-
efit-cost analysis can generate the same outcomes as would result
from a comprehensive benefit-cost assessment. Would the par-
tial tests proffered by Justice Breyer offer a mechanism for
screening out the very worst risk regulations but not be fully in-
formative in eliminating all undesirable policies? Alternatively,
would such partial perspectives on policy attractiveness be mis-
leading in some instances but provide correct guidance in others?
Finally, could Justice Breyer's approaches be no different funda-
mentally from that of the standard economic formulation? Per-
haps he has simply recast our frame of reference for examining
risk regulation questions in a manner that would lead to the same
policy prescription as would the standard economic test, while
avoiding some of the sensitivities embodied in public discussions
of the value of human lives.
Part I of this Article formulates in detail the standard bene-
fit-cost approach to policy evaluation in the risk reduction con-
text. The Part extensively examines the economic technique for
valuing human life and the issues that affect the acceptance of
the benefit-cost test. Parts II and III examine the two alternative
perspectives developed by Justice Breyer: (1) a comparison of
the cost effectiveness of reducing risk in public and private con-
texts, utilizing automobile safety as a personal choice reference
point; and (2) a comparison of the relative magnitude of various
risks, utilizing the placement of cigarette smoking on a risk lad-
der. Each of these Parts explores how the alternative perspective
relates to the basic benefit-cost approach of economists to deter-




The principal economic test for measuring the attractiveness
of any policy option is whether, on balance, the policy option is in
7 Id at 65.
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society's best interests.8 More specifically, do the benefits society
derives from the effort exceed its costs? In the context of risk
reduction policies that are expected to save statistical lives, the
following test is used to determine whether a policy is economi-
cally reasonable:
[Lives Saved][Value of Life] > Cost9  (1)
The following section analyzes the three components of this
equation: statistical lives saved, the cost of risk reduction, and the
value per life saved. Finally, this section explores the place of the
benefit-cost analysis in the political arena.
A. Statistical Lives Saved
First, Equation 1 requires the determination of the total
number of statistical lives saved by the policy. To make this de-
termination, one must examine the magnitude of the risk and the
magnitude of the population exposed to the risk both with and
without a proposed policy. One should also consider discounting
the hypothetical number of lives saved or adjusting the hypothet-
ical number of lives saved for the quality of the lives that are
being saved.
1. Magnitude of the Risk
The magnitude of the risk means the chance that any person
in a population will be affected by that risk. Is there, for exam-
ple, a one in a million chance of cancer that is being reduced, or
is it a much more substantial risk? Additionally, one must assess
how many people are affected by the risk. The hypothetical
number of lives affected by a risk is then calculated by multiply-
ing the magnitude of the risk by the total number of persons af-
fected by the risk. The difference between the number of lives
affected without a certain risk reduction policy and the number
of lives affected with such a policy yields the number of statistical
lives saved by the selected policy.
Of course, quantifying the magnitude of a risk in this man-
ner is not without controversy. In particular, many of the scien-
tific aspects of the analysis are in dispute. 10 Consider, for
8 See STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1.
9 This equation will be referred to throughout as Equation 1.
10 See generally PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW
(Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds., 1993) (exploring many of the scientific disputes).
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example, the risk assessments undertaken to justify the cleanup
of prospective Superfund sites. In its analysis of the desirability
of cleanup, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) assesses the different mechanisms associated with the
risks at each site.11 However, embodied in these estimates is a
series of conservative assumptions that influence the ultimate es-
timate. The main factor affecting these biases is that EPA does
not utilize the average exposure amount or the mean risk associ-
ated with any chemical. Rather, the emphasis is on developing a
conservative estimate of the risk which, for the different compo-
nents, often involves utilization of the upper bound of the 95%
confidence interval around the risk. Thus, in the case of chemical
exposure amounts, for example, the exposure level used for the
risk assessment is typically the upper bound of the exposure dis-
tribution. In other words, the probability that the exposure level
is likely to exceed the actual exposure amount is only .025.12 The
net effect of these various conservative assumptions is unclear,
but the character of the risk assessment process generally results
in an over-assessment of the expected risks because of the em-
phasis on conservative, or worst-case, scenarios.
These types of biases can potentially distort risk regulation
policy-making.13 The degree that conservatism biases policies
may vary from context to context. Ideally, we would like to
know that a one in a million risk from food additives is just as
serious as a one in a million risk from adverse reactions to a
pharmaceutical or a one in a million risk from job hazard expo-
sures. However, if the risk assessment procedures and the biases
incorporated in these procedures differ from agency to agency
and from substance to substance, then meaningful comparisons
cannot be made. This Article assumes that society's objective is
to save the greatest number of lives for any given expenditure.
11 This exercise leads, for example, to results such as an estimated 1/10,000
lifetime risk of cancer from groundwater contamination. See James T. Hamil-
ton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for Superfuind, 21 EcoL-
OGY L.Q. 573, 585 (1994).
12 These types of conservative adjustments affect a variety of components of
the risk assessment. In the case of groundwater ingestion, the upper bound of
the confidence limit is utilized for the ingestion rate, the exposure frequency,
the exposure duration, the chemical concentration, and the toxicity level Id.
13 Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How
Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, REG., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 13,
13-24. See W. ip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Risk Within Reason, 248
Sci. 559, 562 (1990).
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To accomplish this goal, society must have accurate assessments
of the actual risks and not distort risk assessments by incorporat-
ing conservative adjustment factors of unknown and inconsistent
magnitude into the risk assessment process.
2. Magnitude of the Population Exposed
There has also been some controversy in assessing the mag-
nitude of the populations exposed to a risk. Generally, if con-
cern is centered on the expected number of lives that will be
saved by the regulation, then one clearly must move beyond an
assessment of probabilities and consider the actual size or magni-
tude of the populations exposed as well.14 However, in many
cases, this aspect of the risk assessment is not examined because
the focus is on the probabilities. For instance, in the case of
Superfund sites, EPA does not match the risk pathways to sur-
rounding populations to estimate the expected cancer cases for
the populations at risk.15 In some cases it could be possible that
the risk is only present at the Superfund site itself. Conse-
quently, risks associated with such sites could be prevented by
capping and fencing sites and by imposing appropriate deed re-
strictions to prevent people from building houses on the sites in
the future.
3. Discounting Hypothetical Lives Saved
In addition to assessing the probabilities involved and the
populations affected, further refinements in calculating hypothet-
ical lives saved are possible through discounting. For example, if
lives saved by a policy would be saved decades from now, rather
than immediately, such lives should be discounted (i.e., receive a
lower weight) to take the timing into account. Suppose, for ex-
ample, policy A saves five expected lives now and policy B saves
five expected lives ten years from now. Each policy costs $15
million. Are these efforts equally attractive? Policy A is clearly
14 The discussion below will indicate that in many instances, examining the
risk probability is instructive, but one should not lose sight of the importance of
also taking into account the degree of exposure. See infra part III.
15 What EPA does do is distinguish the different classes of population
groups affected by the risk rather than the total number of people affected by
each risk pathway. In research funded by EPA, James T. Hamilton and I are
matching the EPA risk data to U.S. Census population data at the block level in
an effort to establish an estimate of the expected number of cancer cases that
will arise because of the Superfund hazards.
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more attractive because it saves five lives now for a cost at the
time the lives are saved of $15 million. In contrast, policy B saves
the five lives a decade from now, but the cost at the time the lives
are saved is the $15 million invested this year plus any accrued
interest over the next decade on this investment. Therefore, the
cost per life saved during the year that lives are being saved will
be greater for policy B.16 Reversing this logic, lives saved in the
future should be discounted to take into account the lower value
such lives have when compared with lives currently saved.
This discounting distinction is not a mere economic refine-
ment. In fact, discounting was an issue of paramount concern in
the case of the debate over the asbestos regulation between EPA
and the United States Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Because of the substantial time lag before the asbestos
reduction benefits would occur, discounting the benefits would
substantially reduce their value and the relative attractiveness of
the regulation. For example, using the OMB-recommended dis-
count rate of 10%, and assuming a twenty-year lag before the
cancer reductions from asbestos removal took effect, the net in-
fluence of the discounting would be to make the value of these
risk reduction benefits less than 15% of what they would other-
wise have been. At more reasonable discount rates, such as a
real rate of interest of 5%, benefits would be 38% of what they
would have been, and at a 3% rate, benefits would be 55% of
what they would have been. Because of the substantial effect of
discounting based on the choice of interest rate, EPA advocated
that the benefits of the proposed regulation should not be dis-
counted so that the apparent attractiveness of the regulation is
not diminished. In contrast, OMB advocated discounting, which
would have led to less stringent regulation.17
16 For example, if the interest rate is five percent, where this interest is net of
inflation, then the cost at the time the five lives will be saved a decade from now
will be $24.4 million, including the value of the accrued interest. The present
value calculation that simply discounts the expected number of lives saved
rather than converting the current allocations into their future value including
interest leads to the same policy perspective.
17 See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGFmr & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM
OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNmm, APRIL 1, 1988-MARcH 31, 1989, at 35-
37 (1988) [hereinafter 1988-89 REGULATORY PRoGRAM] (stating that OMB ad-
vocates discounting in general).
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4. Adjustments for the Quality of Lives Saved
A second refinement pertains to recognition of the quantity
and the quality of lives saved by a policy. Risk reduction efforts
do not literally save lives; they extend lives. Therefore, the na-
ture of the lives that will be extended as a result of risk reduction
policies is an important issue. For instance, decreasing sulfur ox-
ide emissions will primarily eliminate respiratory ailments among
the very senior members of the population and reduce their asso-
ciated mortality.18 In contrast, improved automobile safety will
affect a much wider age range of the population. Distinctions
based on age raise questions as to whether adjustments should be
made to the hypothetical number of lives saved based upon qual-
ity of life.
Should life-saving efforts that affect individuals with rela-
tively little life left to live receive the same value as those that
benefit people with a much greater life expectancy? Saving a
person's life from a risk of death at age twenty-two surely has a
greater value than saving that person's life from some other risk
of death at age ninety. Ideally, one would like to make some
kind of quantity adjustment to account for the total length of life
lost. Although there have been numerous economic discussions
of such an approach,19 government agencies have not yet incor-
porated this level of refinement into risk regulation policy con-
texts. To be sure, the overall concept of valuing life remains
sufficiently controversial so as to preclude the consideration of
an additional layer of controversy concerning distinctions among
individuals of different ages.
B. Costs of Risk Reduction
The second and perhaps least controversial component of
Equation 1 pertains to the costs associated with a risk reduction
policy. For the most part, ascertaining regulatory costs is an ac-
counting exercise. One simply examines the types of expendi-
tures required by the regulation and tallies them appropriately.
18 JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, CLEAN AIR Acr, LAW AND PRAcrcE § 7.2, at
1 (1991).
19 Richard J. Zeckhauser & Albert L. Nichols, The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration: Its Goals and Achievements, in THE STUDY OF FEDERAL
REGULATION OF THE SENATE COMMrITrEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 163,
163-248 (1979); see FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 30-31; Value of Risks,
supra note 2, at 1920-22.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 3
HeinOnline  -- 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.  438 1994-1995
EQUIVALENT FRAMES OF REFERENCE
There may, however, be substantial uncertainties involved, par-
ticularly in situations in which a regulation would mandate the
development of new technologies, the costs of which are uncer-
tain. For instance, if judgments regarding regulatory costs are
based on the cost of existing technologies that fail to take into
account the cost-reducing influence of technological progress,
such estimates will tend to overstate the associated costs of the
regulation.
The nature of such biases often cannot be predicted in ad-
vance. In the case of the Superfund cleanup efforts, for example,
it appears that the costs of cleanup are much greater then EPA
originally estimated.2 o The ex post analysis of the cost actually
incurred with the cotton dust regulations of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) also suggests that the
costs were greatly misestimated, as were the benefits 2 l In that
case, the errors can be traced to analytical errors in the benefit
and cost assessment process. Yet even though there may be er-
rors in estimates of the costs of risk reduction policies, we should
not dismiss these policies since our policy task is to make the best
policy judgments given the knowledge that is available to us.
However, greater efforts to determine the nature and extent of
the biases in policy evaluation could improve the accuracy of pol-
icy judgments.
Moreover, the determination of actual costs is itself difficult.
One complicating factor is that companies may use the techno-
logical change required by a regulation to overhaul their techno-
logical base, a move that enhances productivity while reducing
the associated risk. In the case of the OSHA cotton dust stan-
dard, textile mills responded to the regulation by installing new
and more efficient technologies that brought about dividends not
anticipated in the original cost estimates.2 However, to the ex-
tent that there were beneficial profitability impacts, one would
want to net these out in determining the ultimate costs of the
regulation. Thus, there exists a general analytical need to under-
20 See Superfund Law Amendment Plans Announced, HAzNE\VS, Apr. 1994,
available in LEXIS, Envim Library, Allnws File (citing a 1994 Congressional
Budget Office study of Superfund costs).
21 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Paul Kolp, Uncertainty in Risk Analysis: A
Retrospective Assessment of the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard, in ADvAxcEs IN
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS 105, 124-27 (V. Kerry Smith ed., 1986).
22 hL at 116.
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take more studies of the monetary costs and benefits of regula-
tions after they take effect.
C. Value Per Life Saved
The third and most controversial component of Equation 1
is the value per life saved. From an economic standpoint, how-
ever, the value per life saved should not be objectionable. It only
represents a description of society's willingness to pay to reduce
various risks to life. While the value per life saved does include
such economic accounting measures as the calculation of the
present value of future earnings, it consists primarily of the bene-
fit of the lifesaving activities to the person affected by these ef-
forts. The value per life saved may also include broader,
altruistic concerns as well to the degree that society wishes.
The willingness of society to pay for risk reduction is framed
in terms of society's willingness to pay for small reductions in
risk, not society's willingness to pay for the elimination of a cer-
tain risk of death. By promulgating a governmental risk regula-
tion, society buys a small reduction in some incremental risk of
perhaps one in a million per year, not a reduction in our
probability of death from 1.0 to 0. A determination cannot be
made either prospectively or retrospectively whose lives are
saved. Sometimes each member of a very large group of poten-
tial beneficiaries faces a comparatively small risk of death. Since
the effects are based on probabilities, it may be that, in actuality,
no lives will be lost, or it may be that many lives will be affected.
The lifesaving effort reduces this probability of death for each of
the exposed individuals. The appropriate societal value of this
risk reduction is the exposed individuals' willingness to pay for
their improved safety, plus any broader willingness to pay on the
part of the unaffected segments of society.
To facilitate such calculations, the value of life figure is ex-
pressed in unit terms per statistical life. For example, consider a
situation in which each of 10,000 individuals faces a 1/10,000 risk
of death and is willing to pay $400 to eliminate that risk. What is
the pertinent value of a statistical life? For this group of 10,000
people, on average one of them will be killed. Moreover, they
would be willing to pay $400 each, multiplied by the 10,000 peo-
ple, or $4 million to save one statistical life. Thus, in this context,
the value of a statistical life is $4 million, or the amount of money
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that could be raised collectively to prevent the one statistical
death to the group's members.
This methodology of establishing the willingness to pay per
unit of risk yields the same results as simply dividing the willing-
ness to pay amount (i.e., $400) by the reduced probability of
death (i.e., 1/10,000). This latter approach has perhaps less intui-
tive appeal, but it is equivalent analytically, and it is possibly
more flexible where there is not a sufficiently large population
affected for there to be one statistical death to provide a basis for
discussion.
Most of the evidence pertaining to the value of life is derived
from labor market evidence, rather than from surveys that ex-
plicitly address society's willingness to pay for reduced risk. In
particular, economists have utilized data on worker earnings,
personal characteristics, and job characteristics, including safety,
and have estimated statistically the wage premium that workers
receive in return for facing higher risks on the job.3 For very
small risks of death, such as the average occupational fatality risk
of 1/10,000 per year, the amount of money that workers demand
to face an added risk is roughly comparable to the value they are
willing to spend to reduce the risk level. As a result, the rate at
which people demand compensation for small risks should, in
theory, provide a good index of how much people are willing to
pay for the government to reduce the risk by a small amount.
The available evidence from labor studies suggests that most of
the wage premium estimates cluster in the range of $300 to $700
per year for the average worker facing the average 1/10,000
risk.24 As a result, these studies imply that the average value of
life is in the range of $3 million to $7 million.
This number is by no means a universal constant. Different
workers have different values of life, depending on their attitudes
towards risk. Workers who have sorted themselves into high-risk
jobs, for example, have comparatively low values of life. These
values tend to be in the range of $1 million.25 Similarly, econo-
23 See, e.g., FATAL TRAnOMS, supra note 2, at 51-59; Garen, supra note 2,
at 12; Olson, supra note 2, at 173.
24 FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 73; see also Garen, supra note 2, at 12
(stating that $4 million is a similar figure to those figures found in other labor
studies); Olson, supra note 2, at 173 (finding yearly estimated risk premiums to
be $350 per year).
25 Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence
from the Labor Market, in HousEHoLD PRODuCriON AND CONSUMPTION 265,
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mists have found that cigarette smokers often have compara-
tively low values of life and attach relatively low values to on-the-
job injuries. 26 This behavior is consistent with smokers placing a
lower value on their health than the general public, not only in
smoking contexts but in other risk-taking contexts as well. Simi-
larly, people who are highly averse to risk may have a value of a
statistical life well in excess of $7 million.27
Other kinds of safety tradeoffs people make provide another
source of evidence on the implicit value of life. For instance,
people make a variety of product safety decisions, such as decid-
ing to wear a seat belt, install a smoke detector, or buy a house in
a low pollution area. Economists have examined each of these
contexts in an effort to attach a value on statistical lives relative
to our expenditures on safety. Table 1 summarizes the implicit
value of life based on a variety of contexts other than jobs. Spe-
cifically, economists have assessed such values based on the ad-
ded price people are willing to pay for risk reduction measures.
For example, if one were willing to pay $30 extra for a smoke
detector that reduced one's risk of death from fire by 1/100,000,
then one's implicit value of life would be $3 million. The smoke
detector studies are the least sophisticated of those listed, as
there is very little variation in the price-risk combinations ex-
265-98 (Nester E. Terleckyj ed., 1976) (finding that workers who are in rela-
tively high risk jobs and face an annual death risk of 1/1,000 per year value their
lives at about $176,000); see also FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 42; Value
of Risks, supra note 2, at 1925-28.
26 See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and
Differences in Wage-Risk Trade-Offs, 25 J. HuM. RESOURCES 202, 217-21
(1990); Pauline M. Ippolito & Richard A. Ippolito, Measuring the Value of Life
Saving from Consumer Reactions to New Information, 25 J. PuB. ECON. 53, 66(1984).
27 W. Kip Viscusi, Occupational Safety and Health Regulation: Its Impact and
Policy Alternatives, in RESARCH IN PUBLIC PoLIcy ANALYSIS AND MANAGE-
MENT 281, 281-99 (J. Crecine ed., 1981) (finding that workers who were rela-
tively risk averse have an implicit value of life of $6.5 million). The results in
the case of nonfatal injuries also indicate the heterogeneity of the value of life.
One study shows that smokers have an implicit value of nonfatal job injuries of
$30,781, whereas individuals who wear seatbelts have an implicit value of job
injuries of $92,245. Seatbelt users are consequently three times as averse to
bearing risks as are cigarette smokers. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 26, at 221.
There is nothing irrational about being willing to spend over $700 to reduce
one's risk of death by 1/10,000. If the risk reductions were very large, budgetary
constraints would come into play, but for small risk changes they will not. The
$3 million to $7 million range estimates are simply representative figures for
groups of workers and by no means bound the value of life numbers that may
be pertinent in a particular circumstance.
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amined.28 The assessments based on property value responses to
air pollution risks and the linkage between various kinds of auto-
mobile risks and implicit value of life are much more sophisti-
cated.2 9 In each of these instances, economists have analyzed
how prices for safer properties or safer automobiles have re-
sponded to the difference in risks embodied in these areas. It is
noteworthy that the implicit values of life obtained in the two
recent studies of automobile accident risks and the price re-
sponse have yielded estimates very similar to those obtained
from labor market choices.3 0 In the case of automobile safety,
the evidence suggests that the implicit value of a statistical life is
in the range of $3 million to $4 million, based on the added price
consumers are willing to pay for safer cars.31 This similarity is to
be expected. If one is acting rationally in allocating one's re-
sources across different domains of choice, we would ideally like
to vary the risk levels in these different domains to achieve the
same risk reduction per dollar expended in all the different areas
of choice available. As a consequence, the consistency between
the value of life estimates for automobile safety and the esti-
mates obtained in the labor market provides at least some indica-
tion that private risk-taking decisions have some component of
rationality.
28 Rachel Dardis, The Value of Life: New Evidence from the Marketplace, 70
J. ENrL._ EcoN. & MGMT. 1077 (1980); Christopher Garbacz, Smoke Detector
Effectiveness and the Value of Saving a Life, EcoN. LE-rERS, Dec. 1986, at 281,
281-86.
29 See Paul R. Portney, Housing Prices, Health Effects, and Valuing Reduc-
tions in Risk of Death, 8 J. ENvm. EcoN. & MGrr. 72 (1981); see also Scott E.
Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, The Valuation of Risks to Life Evidence from
the Market for Automobiles, 72 REv. Eco. & STAT. 133, 133-36 (1990); Mark
K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Tune Preference and Consumer Valua-
tions of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, J. L & EcoN. (forthcoming
1995).
30 Compare Garen, supra note 2, at 12 (labor market study arriving at an
estimated value of life of $4.0 million) with Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note
29, at 135 (automobile accident risk study finding an estimated value of life of
$3.357 million) and Dreyfus & Viscusi, supra note 29, at 25 (automobile con-
sumer studies arriving at value of life estimates of between $2.6 million and S3.7
million).
31 Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 29, at 135; Dreyfus & Viscus, supra
note 29, at 25.
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TABLE 1*




AUTHOR (YEAR) NATURE OF RISK 1990 $s)
Ghosh, Lees, and Highway speed/value 0.07
Seal (1975) of time tradeoff,
1973
Blomquist (1979) Automobile death 12
risks/seat belt use,
1972
Dardis (1980) Smoke detector risk 0.6
reduction, 1974-1979
Portney (1981) Property value 0.8
response to air
pollution risk, 1978
Ippolito and Ippolito Cigarette smoking 0.7
(1984) cessation, 1980
Garbacz (1987) Smoke detector risk 2.0
reduction, 1968-1985
Atkinson and Automobile accident 4.0
Halvorsen (1990) risks/price tradeoff,
1986
Dreyfus and Viscusi Automobile accident 2.9-4.1
(1994) risk/price tradeoff
*FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 66 (citing Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra
note 29, at 133-136; Glenn Blomquist, Value of Life Saving: Implications of
Consumption Activity, 87 J. POL. ECON. 540-58 (1979); Dardis, supra note 28, at
1077-82; Dreyfus & Viscusi, supra note 29, at 2; Garbacz, supra note 28, at 281-
286; Debapriya Ghosh et al., Optimal Motorway Speed and Some Valuations of
Time and Life, 43 MANCHESTER SCHOOL OF ECON. & SOC. STUDIES 134, 134-43
(1975); Ippolito & Ippolito, supra note 26, at 53-81; Portney, supra note 29, at
72-78).
Another approach to valuing life utilizes survey questions in
ascertaining people's willingness to pay for improved safety.
Surveys have been used in a wide variety of contexts, most fre-
quently for motor vehicle accidents. Resulting estimates have
yielded value of life figures comparable to those obtained using
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labor market evidence? 2 The disadvantage of using survey evi-
dence is that the stated willingness to pay for hypothetical reduc-
tions in risk may not coincide with the tradeoffs people will make
when actually confronted with the risk. The potential advantage
of surveys is that the scope of inquiry may be extended to ex-
amine other kinds of deaths that might have a different value
from acute on-the-job accidents or motor vehicle deaths. For ex-
ample, researchers have utilized surveys to examine the value of
reducing deaths from cancer as well as a wide variety of other
outcomes such as chronic bronchitis, temporary poisonings, and
illnesses, such as the common cold.33
Justice Breyer does not select a particular value of life
number based on any of these approaches, though he is sensitive
to the importance of this class of concerns. He writes:
At this point, you may interrupt with a few questions: "Who is
to say whether $1 million, or $10 million, or $240 million, or
$10 billion, is too much, or too little, to spend to save eight or
eighteen or eighty statistical lives? Who can value a human
life?"
I cannot answer these questions except by pointing out that,
every day, each of us implicitly evaluates risks to life. We be-
gin to run risks to achieve our daily objectives the instant we
get out of bed. We find it worth spending money on an ordi-
nary fire alarm system, but not worth installing state-of-the-art
automatic-phone-dialing fire protection. We believe it worth
installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the
Grand Canyon in soft plastic to catch those who might fall
over the edge. 4
Likewise, government agencies have been reluctant to en-
dorse a specific value of life number 3 5 The need to make a dol-
lar estimate rather than to simply endorse a general concept may
32 See FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 69; M.W. JONES-LEE, THE
VALUE OF LiF: AN ECONOMIC ANALsis (1989).
33 See FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 71-72; see also Mark C. Berger et
al, Valuing Changes in Health Risks: A Comparison of Alternative Measures, 53
S. EcoN. J. 967 (1987) (surveying 119 people to determine the value to them of
reducing the risk of minor ailments); W. Kip Viscusi et aL, Pricing Environmen-
tal Health Risks: Survey Assessments of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs
for Chronic Bronchitis, 201 J. ENvT. ECON. & MGrr. 32 (1991) (surveying 389
people to measure the value to them of reducing the risk of contracting chronic
bronchitis).
34 BREYE, supra note 5, at 15-16.
35 See generally Ted R. Miller, Public Policy Willingness to Pay Comes of
Age: Will the System Survive?, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 876 (1989) (citing a disclaimer
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have contributed to the failure of government agencies to explic-
itly adopt this approach which utilizes a specific value of life, un-
til long after the economic literature on this concept had resolved
the principal issues at stake. The pivotal event that led to the
initial use of the value of life methodology was not the realiza-
tion that the economic reasoning was compelling but a realiza-
tion that proper valuation of human life may make legitimate
risk regulations appear more attractive than they would other-
wise be.36
In its analysis of the hazard communication regulation, for
example, OSHA did not assign a value of life to the lives that
would be saved through improved chemical safety. Doing so, in
their view, would be too sensitive. Instead, OSHA assessed the
costs of death for the affected workers based on the present
value of the future earnings of the workers whose lives would be
saved. The regulatory analysis incorporating this measure was
rejected by OMB because the calculated benefits were not in ex-
cess of the costs. After an appeal of the OMB decision to then
Vice President Bush, who was in charge of resolving regulatory
disputes, OSHA and OMB considered an analysis I had prepared
using the value of life methodology, rather than the present value
of lost earnings. This approach increased the benefit value by a
factor of ten, leading the benefits to exceed the costs and provid-
ing the analytical impetus for issuance of the regulation shortly
after the Reagan White House received the analysis? 7
Largely because of the substantial magnitude of reasonable
value of life numbers, which are in the millions, the benefit as-
sessments based on a proper assessment procedure often en-
hance the political prospects of regulations. Indeed, a sound
regulation should pass such a properly formulated benefit-cost
test. As evidenced by the OSHA example, once regulators real-
ize that the economic value of life is not an accounting measure
but instead an expression of societal willingness to pay for reduc-
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that the agency's policy
is opposed to placing a dollar value on human life).
36 See FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 263 (discussing new importance
of risk-dollar tradeoffs in the context of the debate over the OSHA hazard com-
munication regulation); Pete Earley, What's a Life Worth?: Under the Reagan
Administration, It May Be Less Than You Thought, WASH. POST, June 9, 1985,
(Magazine), at 10-13, 36-41 (reviewing the debate over the OSHA hazard com-
munication regulation).
37 Earley, supra note 36, at 36.
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ing small risks to life, the possibility of using these numbers in-
creases dramatically.
At present, OMB recommends that agencies prepare value
of life calculations along the lines outlined above.38 All major
risk regulation agencies undertake such calculations, although
the value of life is not uniform across different agencies. 39 There
is no reason to impose a uniformity requirement even within a
particular agency, as the value of life is not a natural constant and
varies depending upon the particular context. For example, the
United States Department of Transportation should want to
place a higher value of life on the well-being of the lives of airline
passengers than those killed in motor-vehicle crashes because the
airline passengers have a higher income. o Although the Depart-
ment of Transportation has not made such distinctions, differen-
tiations of this type would be in line with the differences in the
willingness to pay for safety of the different groups affected.
38 See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGBmENT & BUDGET, REGULATORY PRO-
GRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNmNT, APRIL 1, 1990-MARCI- 31, 1991,
at 660-66 (1991) [hereinafter 1990-91 REGULATORY PROGRAM].
39 See, e.g., 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 17, at 36.
4o Income status and other factors conceivably will affect the value of life,
though these considerations are controversial and generally have not entered
into the policy debate over specific regulatory actions. Consideration of income
status is certainly not unprecedented in other contexts. For example, in wrong-
ful death and personal injury actions, the value of compensation will be gov-
erned by the present value of lost earnings. Martin B. Adams & Glenn W.
Dopf, Selected Topics in Damages in Personal Injury Actions, in PROVING AND
DEFENDING AGANSr DA_ AGES N PERSONAL INJURY LrTGATION 55 (PLI Li-
tig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 465, 1993). The present
value of lost earnings will clearly increase with one's income level. Fbr exam-
ple, doubling one's annual income will double the present value of the earnings
lost. Similarly, to the extent that some groups in society are willing to pay more
to prevent risks than others, then it may be desirable to place a higher societal
willingness to pay to reduce risk to them than to those more willing to bear risk.
It is for this reason that voluntary risks may well merit quite different treat-
ment than involuntary risks. If people choose to incur high risks knowingly, as
in the case of those who engage in risky recreational activities or who work at
high risk jobs, they have revealed through their decision a lower value of life.
We may consequently wish to place a lower benefit value on reducing risks to
these groups then we would to victims of involuntary risks. Following this logic,
reducing environmental risks that affect broad population groups who have typ-
ically not chosen to be exposed in this manner should be accorded a higher
priority than, for example, achieving a comparable risk reduction that would
affect cigarette smokers who have chosen their activity and are compensated for
their risk by the pleasures they derive from it.
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D. The Benefit-Cost Analysis Debate
One possible reason for policymakers' reluctance to make
such distinctions is that it may not be politically defensible to ap-
pear to place a greater value on saving the rich than the poor.
However, in the airline safety case, as well as in many other regu-
latory contexts, this argument does not have much force. If the
government were paying for the added safety through budgetary
allocations, there might be some reason to dispute a differential
emphasis if the poor were not compensated in some manner.
However, in the case of airline safety, the government is not con-
ferring a subsidy on the wealthy airline passengers. Instead, it is
imposing a cost on airlines that will ultimately be reflected in
higher ticket prices. Those who will pay for the greater safety
will be the airline passengers themselves and, to a lesser extent,
the stockholders in the airline companies. Since the beneficiaries
of the safety effort will ultimately be the ones bearing the finan-
cial burden of the regulation, there should be less reluctance to
make policy distinctions for the heterogeneity in the value of life
than if there were no such linkage.
These concerns with differences across society reflect some
general aspects of the debate over benefit-cost analysis. In par-
ticular, benefit-cost analysis is compelling if the individuals who
"lose" under a particular policy are compensated for their losses.
In that situation, all individuals' welfare will be improved
through the policy. If, however, compensation is not paid, there
will be both winners and losers from a policy. Although one pos-
sible approach is to treat symmetrically the gains to those who
benefit from the effort and the losses from those who suffer, it is
not always the clearcut choice.
Consider smoking, for example. Suppose that smokers de-
rive $20 billion in benefits from their ability to smoke in public
places. Also, suppose that nonsmokers do not wish to be ex-
posed to the smoke, either because of perceived adverse health
effects or simply because of their view that environmental to-
bacco smoke is unpleasant. How large must the losses to the
nonsmokers be for it to be desirable to eliminate public smok-
ing? Under a benefit-cost test, provided that the losses to non-
smokers are below $20 billion, one should not undertake such
regulation. In the current anti-smoking environment, however,
there appears to be little effort to undertake such balancing judg-
ments. The existence of any negative effects, particularly any
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negative adverse health effects, has begun to loom particularly
large within the context of these debates. The standard eco-
nomic approach would ask whether the enjoyment smokers de-
rive from smoking in public exceeds the value of the adverse
health effects and the discomfort to nonsmokers, whereas the
public discussions have devoted little attention to the smoker
benefit aspect of this comparison.4 Even if there were such a
calculation, there might be substantial resistance to benefit-cost
analysis. If the losses to nonsmokers were $19 billion and the
benefits to smokers were $20 billion, public smoking would pass
the benefit-cost test. However, unless the nonsmokers were
compensated in some way, they would not share the enthusiasm
for the policy outcome that efficiency-oriented economists have.
In a world in which there are a variety of policies, there are
often winners and losers from many regulatory efforts. In the
usual case, those adversely affected are seldom narrowly defined
groups, such'as the nonsmokers, but instead are broadly based
constituencies of consumers who pay higher prices and taxpayers
who face increasing deductions from their income. In a policy
world in which there are multiple government programs, our per-
spective should focus on the net effect of all policy efforts rather
than on requiring that every policy make all citizens better off.
The general resistance to benefit-cost analysis may also stem
from a concern that society should not balance risks against cost
but instead should make some absolute commitment to an ade-
quate level of safety unconstrained by financial concerns. The
economists' rejoinder is that the level of safety considered "ade-
quate" clearly depends on the cost of achieving the safety
improvement.
The fact that most government policies would not pass a
benefit-cost test reflects the resistance by government to adopt a
benefit-cost approach. Table 2 lists the cost per life saved for a
wide variety of regulations. This table is similar to that presented
by Justice Breyer, as both of them are based extensively on as-
41 Perhaps the best indication of the neglect of the benefit to smokers is that
EPA's economic assessment of restrictions on smoking in public places does not
assign any dollar benefit whatsoever to the lost enjoyment of smokers but in-
stead focuses only on the losses to nonsmokers. See DAVID H. MuDARpi,
UNITED STATES E oNi Fm.AL PROTECTION Ac;. cy, THE CosTs AND
BENEFrrs OF SMOKING RESTRCrIONS: AN AssEsshiNT OF THE SMOK-FREE
ENVIRONMENT Act OF 1993, .R. REP. 3434, ExEcumVE SusMARY 10 (1994).
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sessments by OMB.42 As this ranking indicates, the reality of
risk regulation policy-making is not to screen out regulations
utilizing a benefit-cost test. If we adopt a value of life threshold
in the range of $5 million, just over one-third of the regulations
in Table 2 would pass a benefit-cost test, with the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) accounting for many of these passing
regulations. The regulations at the bottom of the table would fail
a benefit-cost test. Indeed, in the case of one finalized regula-
tion-the 1989 EPA asbestos regulation-the cost per life saved
is over $100 million.
Table 2 suggests that OMB did not reject any regulatory pro-
posals with a cost per life saved under $142 million.43 Thus, even
though the executive order empowering OMB oversight effort
requires it to reject regulations that do not pass the benefit-cost
test, OMB has eliminated only the most inefficient regulations. 44
The legislative mandates of many regulatory agencies require
that policies be based on criteria other than benefit-cost analysis,
such as elimination of all significant risks 45 and such legislative
mandates override the authority of OMB to eliminate inefficient
regulatory efforts.
TABLE 2*
The Cost of Various Risk-Reducing Regulations Per Life Saved
Cost Per
Initial Annual Life Saved
Year & Annual Lives (Millions
Regulation Status** Agency Risk*** Saved of 1984 $s)
Pass Benefit-Cost Test:
Unvented Space 1980 F CPSC 2.7 in 10 63.000 .10
Heaters
Oil & Gas Well 1983 P OSHA-S 1.1 in 10 50.000 .10
Service
42 See BREYER, supra note 5, at 24-27. In particular, each of these analyses
draws on numbers that were originally generated by John F. Morrall, III, a Bu-
reau Chief in the OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. See
John F. Morrall, m1, A Review of the Record, REG., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25,25-34
(drawing upon some of the results reported in RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 3,
and updated by the author via unpublished communication, July 10, 1990).
43 See infra Table 2, col. 2 (indicating those regulations which were rejected).
44 1990-91 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 38, at 665.
45 See supra note 3.
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Cabin Fire 1985 F FAA 6.5 in 10 15.000 20
Protection
Passive Restraints/ 1984 F NHTSA 9.1 in 1W 1,850.000 30
Belts
Underground 1989 F OSHA-S 1.6 in 1P 8.100 30
Construction I
Alcohol & Drug 1985 F FRA 1.8 in 106 4.200 .50
Control
Servicing Wheel 1984 F OSHA-S 1.4 in 1o 2300 .50
Rims
Seat Cushion 1984 F FAA 1.6 in 1o 37.000 .60
Flammability
Floor Emergency 1984 F FAA 2.2 in 10 5.000 .70
Lighting
Crane Suspended 1988 F OSHA-S 1.8 in 1o 5.000 1.20
Personnel
Platform
Concrete & 1988 F OSHA-S 1.4 in 10s 6.500 1A0
Masonry
Construction
Hazard 1983 F OSHA-S 4.0 in 1o 200.000 1.80
Communication
Benzene/Fugitive 1984 F EPA 2.1 in lWs  0310 2.80
Emissions I I I I _ I
Fail Benefit-Cost Test:
Grain Dust 1987 F OSHA-S 2.1 in 10 4.000 5.30
Radionuclides/ 1984 F EPA 1.4 in 1o 1.100 6.90
Uranium Mimes
Benzene 1987 F QSHA-H 8.8 in 10 3.800 17.10
ArseniclGlass 1986 F EPA 8.0 in 10 0.110 19.20
Plant
Ethylene Oxide 1984 F OSHA-H 4.4 in 1W~ 2.800 25.60
Arsenic/Copper 1986 F EPA 9.0 in 10 0.060 26.50
Smelter
Uranium Mill 1983 F EPA 4.3 in 1W 2.100 27.60
Tailings Inactive I I
Uranium Mill 1983 F EPA 43 in 10 2.100 53.00
Tailings Active I I ----- __
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Asbestos 1986 F OSHA-H 6.7 in 10 74.700 89.30
Asbestos 1989 F EPA 2.9 in 10 10.000 104.20
Arsenic/Glass 1986 R EPA 3.8 in 10' 0.250 142.00
Manufacturing
Benzene/Storage 1984 R EPA 6.0 in 11Y 0.043 202.00
Radionuclides/ 1984 R EPA 4.3 in 106 0.001 210.00
DOE Facilities
Radionuclides/ 1984 R EPA 1.4 in 10 0.046 270.00
Elem.
Phosphorous
Benzene/ 1984 R EPA 2.0 in 106 0.006 483.00
Ethylbenzenol
Styrene
Arsenic/Low- 1986 R EPA 2.6 in 10 0.090 764.00
Arsenic Copper
Benzene/Maleic 1984 R EPA 1.1 in 106 0.029 820.00
Anhydride
Land Disposal 1988 F EPA 2.3 in 108 2.520 3,500.00
EDB 1989 R QSHA-H 2.5 in 104 0.002 15,600.00
Formaldehyde 1987 F OSHA-H 6.8 in W07 0.010 72,000.00
* FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 264 (based on information presented in
Morrall, supra note 42, at 30).
** "P" indicates that rule has been proposed; "R" indicates that rule has been
rejected; "F' indicates that rule is final.
*** Annual deaths per exposed population. An exposed population of 10 is
1000, 104 is 10,000, etc.
Although it would seem ideal if society could eliminate all
premature causes of death, doing so is not feasible because soci-
ety's resources do not permit it. If the entire U.S. gross domestic
product were devoted to eliminating only accidental deaths, so
that all illnesses and nonfatal injuries would not be affected, the
country would only have the resources to spend $55 million per
accidental death to reduce these risks.46 In doing so we would
leave ourselves no resources for any other expenditures, includ-
ing many mortality-related expenditures such as food, health
care, and education. Tradeoffs between risk and monetary ex-
penditures are inevitable as long as the world's resources are
constrained and there remain additional opportunities for en-
46 FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 5.
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hancing safety on which people are willing to spend money. If
drivers were truly indifferent to spending more to enhance safety,
cars would all resemble tanks. Doing so is not sensible because
of the higher fuel costs and time costs incurred by riding in such
vehicles. These costs would be irrelevant if safety alone influ-
enced our decisions, which is what much public rhetoric and con-
gressional legislation would lead us to believe should be the case.
Yet, the fact that society has broader concerns requires people to
make tradeoffs. As the previous discussion has illustrated, the
procedure most frequently advocated by economists is the bene-
fit-cost test. Parts II and Ill explore other alternative approaches
implicit in the various arguments advanced by Justice Breyer.
II
CosT-EFFEcrvENEss MEASURES AND THE
AUTOMOBILE SAFETY PERSONAL CHOICE
REFERENCE PoNrr
Failure to apply an explicit benefit-cost test in the manner
akin to Equation 1 does not imply that risk policy judgments are
being made incorrectly. In particular, one can recast Equation 1
somewhat differently by rearranging terms, leading to the cost-
effectiveness test:
Cost < Value of (2)
Lives Saved Life.47
The left-hand side term in Equation 2 is the cost-effectiveness
measure; that is, it represents the cost that must be expended per
statistical life saved. Ideally, one would want to undertake all
expenditures for which the cost per life saved were less than the
value of life.48 Doing so yields the same result as the benefit-cost
test in Equation 1. Justice Breyer, however, in assessing risk,
utilizes automobile safety as a personal choice reference point in
order to compare public risk choices with private decisions. Em-
ploying this process, Breyer completely avoids determining the
value of life. Thus, this method of risk assessment concentrates
47 This equation will be referred to throughout as Equation 2.
48 Similarly, in the case of the cost-effectiveness measures, one can also
make quantity and quality adjustments by, for example, equalizing the cost per
discounted year of life saved across different policy options.
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solely on the left-hand side term in Equation 2, or simply, the
cost per life saved.
Where there are a variety of opportunities to enhance risk
and where the extent of the risk reduction is continuously al-
tered, the desired outcome is to equalize the cost per life saved in
all contexts. In particular, the stringency of society's risk reduc-
tion efforts should be increased so that the cost per statistical life
saved is identical, whether the situation pertains to home acci-
dents, work accidents, or environmental exposures. If there is
some discrepancy, such as a lower cost per life saved for automo-
bile accidents, then resources should be reallocated and more at-
tention should be devoted to this area than to other safety
contexts for which the cost per life saved is higher. Doing so will
save more statistical lives for less money than if the cost per life
saved were not equalized in different settings.
This general principle is implicit in Justice Breyer's discus-
sion of whether some of the particularly expensive risk regula-
tion efforts are ill-chosen. Breyer frames the risk reduction
decision in terms of an individual's personal willingness to spend
money for improved automobile safety.49 The regulatory issue
that he initially considers is asbestos removal costs.50 In particu-
lar Breyer considers whether it is worthwhile to allocate $100 bil-
lion to remove asbestos from schools given the magnitude of the
risks involved. Justice Breyer reasons as follows:
A mid-range $100 billion figure, assuming a mid-range ten
lives saved annually for forty years, means an expenditure of
$250 million per statistical life saved over forty years. Is this
sensible? We can translate the figure into a more intuitively
accessible number by recalling that auto accidents kill about
fifty thousand people each year. We might then imagine how
much we would willingly pay for a slightly safer car, a car that
would reduce auto deaths by, say, 5 percent, to 47,500. Would
we pay an extra $1,000 for such a car? An extra $5,000 for that
added contribution to safety? To spend $100 billion as a na-
tion to save ten lives annually assumes we value safety so
much that each of us would pay $48,077 extra for any such
new, slightly safer car. Perhaps the cost estimates are exagger-
ated. Perhaps Americans are more willing to run voluntary,
automobile-related risks, than to run involuntary, school-re-
lated risks; perhaps they believe death (at an old age) by can-
49 BREYER, supra note 5, at 13-14.
50 BREYER, supra note 5, at 12-13.
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cer is worse than death (at a younger age) in an auto accident.
So, let us divide the estimates in half, and in half again. We
would still find that the slightly safer car cost over $12,000 ex-
tra. Compare airbags, which cost $200 to $500 per car and
may save 3,000 to 10,000 lives per year. It seems unlikely that
the public would pay 24 to 60 times more per car to save far
fewer lives 51
Justice Breyer proceeds to analyze other types of regulation,
such as asbestos shingles and asbestos coating.5 For example,
these regulations, which would only cost $200 million to $300
million per year, would be sensible to pursue if we were willing
to pay $6,400 extra for each new, slightly safer car (five percent
safer).
Clearly, one can apply the safer car reference point in other
contexts as well. The key economic question that I vill address
here is the extent to which this private reference point for risk
reduction comparisons provides a reasonable basis for assessing
the risk regulation policy options. Viewed in terms of the cost-
effectiveness measure discussion above, the Breyer discussion
suggests that internal consistency in decision-making demands
that one should be willing to spend the same amount on auto
safety choices in terms of the cost per life saved on an individual
basis as on a societal basis. This correspondence certainly ap-
pears reasonable since the collective cost ultimately will be borne
by individuals within our society.
Reliance on our private valuations assumes that there is a
strong relationship between our private willingness to pay for
safety and what we would pay for safety from publicly provided
sources. Presumably the mechanism by which the safety is pro-
vided is not consequential in most instances so that we can focus
on the outcome as the matter of interest rather than the process
by which it is generated. By comparing the cost-effectiveness of
public and private choices and requiring a degree of consistency
within those choices, it is clear that unreasonable regulations im-
ply unreasonableness in other contexts. Since at present more
modest actions have been chosen, Breyer's approach highlights
the need for balance in our public risk reduction decisions.
The cost-effectiveness approach appears quite different from
a mechanical calculation of the benefits and costs of a policy.
51 BREYEi, supra note 5, at 13-14.
52 BREYE ., supra note 5, at 14.
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However, is it truly substantively different? Will different kinds
of policies be adopted under the Breyer auto safety reference
point than under a benefit-cost test? Within the traditional bene-
fit-cost framework, the task is to place a dollar value on human
life, multiply it by the lives saved, and assess whether the regula-
tion passes the test. Or, in terms of Equation 2, the analysis
takes some specific dollar figure for the value of life and asks
whether the cost per life saved is below this amount. The differ-
ence in Justice Breyer's approach is that he does not assign a
specific number to the value of life. Instead, he attempts to iden-
tify reference points from other decisions we make about risk
and asks whether we would want to alter these decisions in a
manner that would imply greater risk reduction than we have
currently chosen.
This thought process is simply a more fully articulated ver-
sion of what is entailed in the benefit-cost approach. The value
of life numbers used in the benefit-cost calculations are derived
from the implicit decisions people make in their risk-taking be-
havior. The most commonly used metric is based on the extra
wages that workers are paid for taking on additional risk.5 3
However, there have also been studies of the automobile price-
risk relationship that have yielded very similar values.54 The only
difference between the approaches is that the direct benefit-cost
approach would take these explicit value of life estimates based
on statistical analyses and insert them into a formal quantitative
analysis, without formally articulating the genesis of these num-
bers for each regulatory policy decision. Breyer's approach, on
the other hand, leads one through the risk tradeoff process that
generates these value of life numbers. Instead of assigning a dol-
lar value to life, he asks whether the private safety decisions that
would have led to some dollar value under the benefit-cost analy-
sis still appear desirable given an apparent willingness to opt for
very stringent risk regulations in public risk regulation contexts.
Analytically, the two approaches are identical. The Breyer
cost-effectiveness approach is in no way more limited than the
formal benefit-cost test. Both approaches will lead to the same
policy outcomes, provided that individuals maintain the risk-tak-
ing preferences they made in contexts such as Breyer's automo-
bile risk reference point. Yet, Breyer's approach sacrifices the
53 See, e.g., FATAL TRADEOm, supra note 2, at 34-41.
54 See Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 29, at 135-36.
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brevity associated with the mechanical implementation of a ben-
efit-cost test using a pre-established value of life number. He
gains a formal articulation of the economic reasoning underlying
the benefit-cost test that will force people to impose some inter-
nal consistency on their views throughout the logic of the risk-
cost tradeoff process.
Use of the cost-effectiveness measure to resolve inconsisten-
cies may apply to government policies as well. Ideally, all gov-
ernment agencies should tighten regulations until they have the
same cost per life saved.55 As Table 2 indicates, substantially
more lives could be saved for less money if there were a realloca-
tion of resources across government agencies. Based on these
-estimates, the FAA regulations appear to be a comparative bar-
gain in that their costs are considerably below the $5 million per
life threshold.5 6 In contrast, many other regulatory agencies,
such as OSHA and EPA, appear to have often issued excessively
stringent regulations.57
If the populations protected by these regulations were iden-
tical, it would be desirable to equalize the cost per life saved
across federal agencies and make this amount consistent with
what an individual would choose in terms of relative degree of
safety. This is a problem of inconsistency to which Justice Breyer
devotes substantial attention.58 Breyer notes, for example, that
"the values that regulators implicitly attach to the saving of a sta-
tistical life vary widely from one program or agency to an-
other."59 Although he does not link the discrepancies among
agencies back to his automobile safety case, he does link them to
the implicit value of life cutoff from the labor market, citing my
estimates of the value of life in the range of $5 million to $6 mil-
lion.60 Thus, Breyer's approach, in effect, utilizes cost-effective-
ness analysis by calculating the cost per life saved and
hypothesizing a possible value of life reference point as a cutoff.
Since his value of life reference point is the same value that one
55 There are two qualifiers to this approach. First, the affected populations
should be the same. Second, it should be feasible to vary the stringency of the
regulations on a continuous basis.
56 FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 52-54 (incorporating information
presented in Morrall, supra note 42, at 30).
57 FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 52-54.
58 BRER supra note 5, at 21-28.
59 BREYE, supra note 5, at 22.
60 BREgYR, supra note 5, at 97 n.110.
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would use in the context of a benefit-cost analysis, it would lead
to the same result.
Within the context of his discussion of inconsistency and
cost-effectiveness, Breyer turns to a principal theme that has
been the subject of substantial recent debate, namely, the role of
regulatory expenditures in depressing individual income, and
thus boosting societal mortality rates. Unlimited expenditures
for life-saving efforts are not desirable because such expenditures
will make us poorer.61 Higher income levels have been associ-
ated with increased longevity throughout human history.62 As
our income levels have risen, we have improved our nutrition,
our health care, and other health-related activities in a manner
that has led to great advances extending human life.63 The early
debate focused on a tradeoff rate of $7.25 million in regulatory
expenditures that would lead to the loss of one statistical life.64
Based on these estimates, any time the government spent $7.25
million or more to save a statistical life, at least one life would be
lost because society would be made poorer by these costs. How-
ever, this $7.25 million number at face value appears to be im-
plausible. How is it that society would be willing to spend from
$3 million to $7 million to save a statistical life, while at the same
time such an expenditure would lead to the loss of a statistical
life because of its effect in making us poorer? Clearly there is
some inconsistency with these estimates as either the implicit
value of life estimate is too high or the amount of expenditure
that will lead to the loss of a statistical life is too low.
The estimates I have developed for OMB, which are based
indirectly on the value of life estimates from the standpoint of
prevention, suggest that for every $50 million drop in societal in-
come there is a loss of one statistical life because of the mortal-
ity-income relationship. 65 Thus, many of the regulations included
61 BREYER, supra note 5, at 23.
62 BREYER, supra note 5, at 23.
63 BREYER, supra note 5, at 23-28. The link between income and health has
also been recognized by a federal appeals judge who stated that "larger incomes
can produce health by enlarging a person's access to better diet, preventive
medical care, safer cars, greater leisure, etc." International Union UAW v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring
separately).
64 BREYER, supra note 5, at 23.
65 See W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Eval-
uation Criteria, RAND J. ECON., Spring 1994, at 94, 108 (reporting the $50 mil-
lion figure developed for OMB).
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in Table 2, such as the EPA uranium mill tailings regulation and
the OSHA asbestos regulation, do not on balance save lives.
Rather, their costs are so great that they lead to more lives lost
than lives saved. Once it is recognized that exorbitant expendi-
tures per human life saved may be detrimental, realization that
limits must be imposed on the stringency of risk regulations will
follow.
Nevertheless, there may be some differences in the valuation
of privately and publicly provided safety in that the altruistic val-
ues of society with respect to safety improvements of others
should be taken into account as well.
Treating altruism within the context of risk regulation poli-
cies is potentially problematic. An important concern is the ex-
tent to which altruistic concerns embody a legitimate concern
with the well being of others as opposed to a desire to impose
risk preferences on them. It may be, for example, that we would
not ourselves wish to be exposed to the same level of risks as
those borne by coal miners. That desire may lead to an impetus
to impose job safety standards that ultimately may reduce their
wages and employment prospects. These types of regulations
may be in the best interests of the miners if they do not accu-
rately perceive the risks and understand the consequences of
these hazards for their welfare. However, if they do understand
the risks and are in fact compensated for them through higher
wages, then, based on the preferences of the miners themselves,
their welfare may not be enhanced by imposing regulatory
requirements that disrupt their current employment
relationships. 66
An additional concern with respect to altruism is that if the
altruistic concern is taken into account in ascertaining the bene-
fits of risk regulation policy, then the altruistic concern should be
taken into account in determining the costs as well. Regulations
impose a variety of costs by raising product prices, reducing
worker wages, and increasing taxes. Such costs reduce individual
welfare. To the extent an altruistic concern with welfare levels
exists, there will be an altruistic component to the cost of regula-
tion. The critical question is whether there is a net altruistic ben-
efit derived from the regulatory activity, which presumably
66 Tis assumes the fact that coal miners have some mobility in their choice
of occupation. Thus, their decision to work in the mines is a result of assessing
the risk and compensation rather than being captured labor.
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should stem from society's special concern with health status as
opposed to other welfare-enhancing aspects of people's lives.
III
RISK MAGNITUDE AND CIGARETrE SMOKING ON THE
RISK LADDER
Reformulating the condition for policy attractiveness so that
the focal point of interest is the number of lives saved yields the
following rearrangement of Equation 2:
Lives Saved > Total Cost 67 (3)Value of Life.
Under this formulation, a policy is attractive provided that the
expected number of lives saved exceeds its total costs divided by
the value of a statistical life. This formulation lacks the intuitive
appeal of the cost per life saved measure that was the focal point
of Equation 2. As a consequence, to the extent that risk analysts
address the risk magnitude as a concern, it is usually in terms of
discussing simply the expected number of lives saved. Justice
Breyer follows this trend in his examination of a risk magnitude
test that is based upon a comparison of various risks to cigarette
smoking on a risk ladder.68
Since only one term of the benefit-cost analysis is usually
examined under this equation, there is no assurance that simply
focusing on the risk magnitude within this context will lead to an
appropriate decision. The main reason for this inadequacy is that
the risk alone is not sufficient to dictate the desirability of policy
action. What matters is the risk-cost tradeoff. This lesson is ap-
parent within the context of U.S. government regulations, often
in ways that may be surprising. For example, FAA once chose
not to require wing modifications for the DC-10 that cost $2000
per plane because it would reduce the risk of an accident involv-
ing the plane by only one in a billion. 69 However, for any reason-
able estimate of the number of times the plane would fly and the
number of passengers on the plane, this regulatory expenditure
would have been desirable. Thus, focusing on the risk, which
may appear to be small, may not be sufficient since the costs may
67 This equation will be referred to throughout as Equation 3.
68 See discussion infra notes 72-75 and accompanying discussion.
69 RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 3, at 112-13.
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be small as well. There is simply no substitute for looking at the
extent of the risk reduction and what we must expend to achieve
this risk reduction, in order to formulate a sound regulatory
policy.
The expected number of lives saved consists of two compo-
nents: the probability that mortality will be reduced and the
number of people affected. Some discussions of risk emphasize
how small the relevant probabilities are as a way of suggesting
that very little is being accomplished for what may be very sub-
stantial expenditures. In other cases, particularly with respect to
the recent debate over Superfund, the focal point has shifted to
the number of people exposed.70 In particular, the government
has devoted substantial resources to cleaning up hazardous waste
sites in areas where there are no populations at risk.71 It appears
that greater gains could be achieved by reallocating our cleanup
efforts so that the sites that pose real risks to current populations
would receive greater attention.
Breyer also focuses on the risks, presenting a risk ladder as a
mechanism for indicating the relative magnitude of the risk.72
The main reference point used in the risk ladder is cigarette
smoking.73 For example, the risk of being killed in five airline
trips is equivalent to smoking ten cigarettes, whereas the risk of
being a sky diver is less than that of being a pack-a-day smoker.
This cigarette metric74 is a means for converting risk into units
that are more readily understood. However, this metric appears
to be less attractive than the automobile accident risk metric that
Breyer utilized.7 5
First, the majority of the U.S. population does not smoke. 6
Therefore, most Americans have rejected incurring any risk from
70 W. Kip Viscusi & James T. Hamilton, Superfund and Real Risks, AM. EN.
ERPiusE, MarJApr. 1994, at 38.
71 ld.
72 BEYER, supra note 5, at 3-6.
73 BmREn, supra note 5, at 3-6.
74 See BREYER, supra note 5, at 6 (citing ROBERT CANMERON MITCHELL &
RcHARD T. CARSON, REPORT TO THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEcTION
AGENCY BY RESOURCES FOR THE FrUTR, VALUING DRNKING WATER RE-
DUCTIONS USING THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD: A METHODOLOGI-
CAL STUDY OF RISKS FROM THM Am GIARDIA (1986)).
75 See supra part 1I.
76 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Smoking Among
Adults - United States, 1992, and Changes in the Definition of Current Cigarette
Smoking, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 342, 342-46 (1994) (re-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
1994]
HeinOnline  -- 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.  461 1994-1995
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
cigarettes. Indeed, smoking is generally viewed as socially unac-
ceptable. In contrast, in the automobile safety context, car own-
ers have made a decision to provide for only partial safety in
their cars.77 Each owner has made implicit judgments to accept
some degree of risk in that area. Thus, in the cigarette cases it is
not possible to make the same kind of link back to individual
decisions as in the automobile case. The smoking risk is a risk
most have rejected as being too great given the pleasure we
might expect to derive from smoking. Following this logic, it can-
not be said that being a skydiver is acceptable from a risk stand-
point because one has chosen to be a pack-a-day smoker, and
one should be consistent in risk-taking behavior.
To the extent that using the cigarette reference point is use-
ful, it is from a more limited standpoint of indicating that there
are commonly incurred risks that are of substantial or much
greater magnitude. This metric may help people think more sen-
sibly about the size of the risk. However, it will not be entirely
successful in enabling people to think through the tradeoff pro-
cess that is necessary to lead to the sound risk policy decisions
that result from the benefit-cost analysis approach or the cost-
effectiveness approach.
Second, the cigarette reference point is useful only to the
extent that people accurately perceive the risk and understand
the risk content of the metric. The available survey evidence sug-
gests that smoking risks are not well understood.78 Overall, both
smokers and nonsmokers overestimate the total mortality risks
associated with smoking.79 Moreover, they greatly overestimate
the lung cancer risk from smoking.80 In addition, all population
groups overestimate the life expectancy loss due to smoking.81
The usefulness of a reference risk scale will be impeded to the
extent that the underlying metric is not accurately perceived.
porting that according to the Centers for Disease Control, in 1992, 26.5% of
United States adults were current smokers).
77 I am excluding from consideration the small segment of the U.S. popula-
tion that chooses never to drive automobiles. In all likelihood the people who
have chosen not to drive have made this decision because of the availability of
public transit. Moreover, even those who do not personally drive, ride in taxis
and in other people's cars. In contrast, there is a much clearer decision not to
smoke taken by nonsmokers that is motivated by the substantial risk involved.
78 W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 61-83 (1992).
79 Id at 77.
80 Id
81 Id at 79-81.
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There is no available evidence to suggest that smoking risk be-
liefs are sound, as the public has responded to the substantial
publicity regarding these hazards and maintains a somewhat bi-
ased perception of the risks entailed in smoking behavior.
Third, the character of the risks is quite different from many
risk contexts. In the case of sky diving, drunken driving, and job
accidents, the risks are immediate. People die in their prime,
and, in some cases, the victims are children with substantial life
expectancies that are being lost. In contrast, cigarette smoking
generally has a much more modest effect on life expectancy than
acute accident events. The estimated life expectancy loss associ-
ated with cigarettes is 3.6 to 7.2 years,8 which is comparatively
short. Moreover, the loss is substantially deferred, often by many
decades, whereas accidents often kill upon impact. Thus, refer-
ence to a cigarette smoking risk index may induce undue
complacency.
Overall, there are a variety of competing biases at work.
The over-assessment of smoking risks may make other risks ap-
pear too great when compared to the risks of cigarettes, whereas
the deferred nature of smoking risks and the small extent of life
lost may make other risks appear too small. Most importantly,
because the majority of the population has chosen not to incur
smoking risks, the cigarette risk metric will not serve as a fully
adequate measure of the continuum of risk-cost tradeoffs that
can be used as a reference point for risk decisions. For these
reasons, the automobile safety reference point developed by Jus-
tice Breyer is a better standard than the cigarette reference.
Another simpler technique for assessing the merits of a risk
reduction effort based on the magnitude of the risk effect is to
examine the magnitude of a variety of different risks as a simple
mechanism for putting the risk in perspective. Table 3 summa-
rizes different activities that lead to a 1/1,000,000 risk of death.
We incur a 1/1,000,000 risk of death by living two days in New
York City due to the air pollution risk, flying 1000 miles by jet,
eating forty tablespoons of peanut butter, or eating a hundred
charcoal broiled steaks. Consideration of figures such as these
often helps to put relatively small risks in perspective. Do we
truly want to regulate minuscule hazards that may, for example,
8 Id. at 80.
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be below the risks associated with drinking water and similar
commonly accepted risks?
TABLE 3*
Risks That Increase the Annual Death Risk by One in One
Million
Acrrvrry CAUSE OF DEATH
Smoking 1.4 cigarettes Cancer, heart disease
Drinking 0.5 liter of wine Cirrhosis of the liver
Spending 1 hour in a coal mine Black lung disease
Spending 3 hours in a coal mine Accident
Living 2 days in New York or Air pollution
Boston
Traveling 6 minutes by canoe Accident
Traveling 10 minutes by bicycle Accident
Traveling 150 miles by car Accident
Flying 1000 miles by jet Accident
Flying 6000 miles by jet Cancer caused by cosmic
radiation
Living 2 months in Denver Cancer caused by cosmic
radiation
Living 2 months in average Cancer caused by natural
stone or brick building radioactivity
One chest X-ray taken in a Cancer caused by radiation
good hospital
Living 2 months with a cigarette Cancer, heart disease
smoker
Eating 40 tablespoons of peanut Liver cancer caused by aflatoxin
butter B
Drinking Miami drinking water Cancer caused by chloroform
for 1 year
Drinking 30 12-oz. cans of diet Cancer caused by saccharin
soda
Living 5 years at site boundary Cancer caused by radiation
of a nuclear power plant in the
open
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Drinking 1000 24-oz. soft drinks Cancer from acrylonitrile
from banned plastic bottles monomer
Living 20 years near PVC plant Cancer caused by vinyl chloride
(1976 standard)
Living 150 years within 20 miles Cancer caused by radiation
of a nuclear power plant
Eating 100 charcoal-broiled Cancer from benzopyrene
steaks
Risk of accident by living within Cancer caused by radiation
5 miles of a nuclear reactor for
50 years
* Richard Wilson, Analyzing the Daily Risks of Life, 81 TECHNOLOGY REV.,
Feb. 1979, at 40, 40-46
These questions can often be instructive, but ultimately such
judgments should not be made independent of cost. For exam-
ple, even small hazards may be worth eliminating if the financial
expenditure involved is relatively small. However, perhaps the
risk table and risk ladder are most useful in framing the terms of
the debate to indicate that there is not a commitment to a zero-
risk society. Many government agencies have absolutist legisla-
tive mandates that require the elimination of all significant risks
or, in some cases, to ensure zero-risk. However, examination of
statistics such as those in Table 3 suggests that a no-risk society is
not only infeasible but is inconsistent with a host of decisions that
we have chosen to make in other domains. Consideration of
such risk figures ultimately should lead us back to the broader
policy perspectives embodied in the benefit-cost test and the
cost-effectiveness measures discussed above. Breyer undertakes
a similar kind of comparison with other risks in the case of asbes-
tos regulation.8 In order to put the asbestos exposure in schools
in terms that can be readily understood, he compares this risk to
the fatality rate from whooping cough vaccinations, aircraft acci-
dents, high school football, drownings, motor vehicle accidents,
home accidents, and long-term smoking.8 A complete compari-
son would have included the cost numbers associated with possi-
ble risk reductions in these areas as well. In particular, asbestos
reduction may cost $100 billion. How much does it cost to
83 BREYER, supra note 5, at 13.
84 BREYE, supra note 5, at 13.
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achieve comparable risk reduction in other contexts? Ultimately,
this type of calculation leads back once again to whether the cost
per life saved is out of line. If more is being spent in terms of the
cost per life saved to remove asbestos from the schools, perhaps
efforts should be redirected toward other, more effective regula-
tory efforts such as those undertaken by FAA and related poli-
cies that appear in the top portion of Table 2. The magnitude of
risk has also been a more general regulatory issue with respect to
all environmental risks. For example, British cancer researchers
Richard Doll and Richard Peto have found that a very small per-
centage of the cancer risks faced are due to the environmental
exposures that are the target of governmental regulation.8
These statistics, which are cited by Justice Breyer in his discus-
sion of whether our cancer risk policies have an appropriate fo-
cus, suggest that if efforts are redirected away from minuscule
risks and attention is focused on truly substantial risks, there will
be a dramatic shift in the regulatory agenda. Based on the analy-
sis of the different causes of risk, the risks posed by tobacco and
diet loom particularly large and dwarf those associated with the
occupational exposures or pollution exposures that are the fre-
quent targets of government interventions.
CONCLUSION
Although the design of risk regulations has not yet attained
what might be termed the economist's ideal of maximizing the
difference between benefits and costs, substantial progress has
been made in the design of regulatory policy. When the risk reg-
ulation agencies began their efforts in the early 1970s, there was
widespread concern that something needed to be done to address
the important risks that society faces. The substantial optimism
with respect to our technological capabilities in reducing risk
may have led to a failure to recognize the limits of our risk regu-
lation ventures. Over time, there has been increasing emphasis
on the need to attain some degree of risk balancing. Since the
Ford and Carter administrations, agencies have been required to
calculate the benefits and costs of their regulatory activities.8 6 In
85 Richard Doll & Richard Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Esti-
mates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 1191, 1256-58 (1981).
86 President Ford established the inflationary impact process through Exec.
Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1974), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3
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the Bush and Clinton administrations, agencies have been addi-
tionally required to undergo a review by the OMB to ensure that
the benefits are greater than the costs in the case of major regula-
tions.87 However, this test is not binding when it conflicts with
the agency's legislative mandate which, in the case of risk and
environmental regulations, is almost always the case. The high
cost per life saved of many policies is evidence of this exemption.
Nevertheless, it appears that some of the least productive regula-
tions have been eliminated as part of this oversight process. Un-
fortunately, much of the policy debate has been cast in terms of
whether the objective is to have more or less regulation. A more
appropriate concern should be with developing better regula-
tions. There is a legitimate need to regulate the many risks that
society faces, particularly in contexts such as the environment
where no market process exists that would lead to the compensa-
tion of the individuals bearing the risk or ensure that the risks
were set at appropriate levels. Although there is a rationale for
government regulation of risk, this mandate is not unbounded.
We are increasingly recognizing that certain tradeoffs are inevita-
ble. In some cases, opponents of regulation raise the tradeoffs
issue, pointing out that the costs are not commensurate with the
benefits. However, even advocates of regulation may raise the
tradeoff issue in a different guise by suggesting that for the sub-
stantial costs incurred, regulatory agencies should achieve more
than they have with risk regulation policies to date. Ultimately,
society shares the objective of achieving the greatest risk reduc-
tion possible for the money that is spent. The political contro-
versy can consequently focus on how far we will go in these risk
reduction efforts. At the very minimum, assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of different regulatory alternatives is essential to
C.F.R. 161 (1976). The Council on Wage and Price Stability was established in
November 1974 within the Executive Office of the President to oversee the
impact process. Through Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978), Presi-
dent Carter strengthened the review process by requiring that agencies show
that "alternative approaches have been considered and the least burdensome of
the acceptable alternatives have been chosen." See RISK BY CHoICF supra
note 3, at 138-40.
87 President Reagan established the principles for his oversight process
through Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). Reagan also issued Exec.
Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), which required agencies to submit draft
regulatory proposals to OMB. See FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 2, at 256-57.
The Clinton oversight process is governed by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R.
638 (1993).
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enable us to target our resources most effectively. The different
analytical frameworks that we can use to address these issues are
quite diverse. As this Article indicates, no approach alone pro-
vides profitable insights. A complete assessment of the benefits
and costs of regulation is but one mechanism for assessing the
attractiveness of policies. A potentially more useful means for
eliminating the different economic mechanisms at work is the
utilization of a reference point based on private risk-taking activ-
ities. Justice Breyer deftly employs an automobile safety refer-
ence point in his analysis. Within the context of discussing our
private risk choices, it is possible to explore the underlying risk
tradeoffs that we make in other situations and assess how they
will in turn influence our appropriate choice of government poli-
cies. In effect, this technique serves as a mechanism for articulat-
ing the underpinnings of the benefit-cost test and provides a
framework for reexamining both public and private risk choices.
Other techniques, such as examination of the risk probability
levels or the regulatory costs, also may be instructive, particularly
with reference to other risk situations. In some instances, simple
comparisons that highlight the small magnitude of the risk com-
pared with other risk reduction opportunities that are available
may be sufficient to enable the elimination of policy options that
accomplish very little. By utilizing a diversity of risk perspectives
as does Justice Breyer in Breaking the Vicious Circle, risk policies
may be better evaluated and designed. Doing so may best foster
our ultimate objective of enhancing society's welfare.
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